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OPINION OF THE COURT
3                        
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Winston McPherson, presently confined in the Pennsylvania prison system on a
murder conviction, brought a civil rights action in the District of New Jersey seeking
monetary relief on the ground that New Jersey and Pennsylvania law enforcement
officials denied him his right to consular notification under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (“Vienna Convention”).  The District Court sua sponte dismissed
McPherson’s complaint, concluding that the Vienna Convention does not create an
individual right that is enforceable in domestic courts, and that McPherson’s suit is barred
by the statue of limitations.  Without deciding whether the Vienna Convention confers an
individual right to consular notification, we agree with the District Court that
McPherson’s suit is time-barred.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
I.
As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of this case, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.
McPherson is a Jamaican citizen who emigrated to the United States in 1986.  He
alleges that he was arrested in 1988 and again in 1993, but neither arrest led to a
conviction.  McPherson claims that at no point during those arrests did police tell him that
he had a right to consult with the Jamaican consulate.  
In 1995, New Jersey law enforcement officials took McPherson into custody for
The date of McPherson’s conviction was not included in the record before us, but1
it was reflected in the records for McPherson’s earlier criminal and civil proceedings.  We
can, and will, take judicial notice of the official record of prior court proceedings.  See
United States ex rel. Geisler v. Walters, 510 F.2d 887, 890 n.4 (3d Cir. 1975) (taking
judicial notice of briefs and petitions from prior habeas corpus proceedings to make “a
full and proper record”).
Article 36, in pertinent part, provides: 2
[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
(continued...)
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questioning regarding a robbery.  While McPherson was detained, questioning turned to a
murder that took place in Philadelphia.  He was eventually extradited to Pennsylvania,
tried before a jury for murder, and found guilty on January 12, 1996.1
McPherson then challenged his conviction in state and federal court.  In 1998,
McPherson filed a pro se petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat § 9541, et seq.  The Court of Common Pleas appointed
counsel, who submitted a letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988), stating that McPherson’s petition lacked merit.  The Court of Common
Pleas subsequently dismissed the petition.  McPherson obtained new counsel and
appealed.  In a brief served on June 14, 1999, McPherson argued that his prior counsel
was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the violation of his rights under Article
36 of the Vienna Convention.   The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of2
(...continued)2
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the
said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under
this sub-paragraph.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
5
McPherson’s PCRA petition.  Commonwealth v. McPherson, 754 A.2d 20 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied allocatur.  Commonwealth v.
McPherson, 759 A.2d 921 (Pa. 2000).
In 2001, McPherson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  McPherson argued, again, that his
prior counsel was ineffective for failing to allege that his right to consular notification
under the Vienna Convention was violated.  The District Court denied the petition.  As to
the ineffective assistance claim concerning his alleged rights under the Vienna
Convention, the District Court concluded that McPherson could not show that his defense
to the murder charge was prejudiced by the failure to confer with the Jamaican consulate. 
McPherson v. Lavan, No. Civ. 01-3499, 2002 WL 32341785, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30,
2002).  We denied McPherson’s request for a certificate of appealability on June 24,
2003.
  On December 26, 2007, McPherson filed the present suit against various
governmental entities and officials, seeking damages for the alleged violation of the
6Vienna Convention.  McPherson also contended that the failure to provide consular
notification violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
McPherson asserted jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350.  
Because McPherson brought his action in forma pauperis and sought redress from
the government, the District Court reviewed the complaint sua sponte for possible
dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).  Both provisions require the
court to dismiss a complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.  The Court dismissed McPherson’s claims against the State of New
Jersey, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the United States of America, and various
prosecutorial defendants, concluding that they are immune from suit.  McPherson v.
United States, No. 2-07-cv-06119, 2008 WL 2985448, at *5-6, *11 (D.N.J. July 31,
2008).  McPherson does not challenge these rulings.  The District Court also dismissed
the claims arising under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, concluding that
they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  McPherson, 2008 WL
2985448, at *10.
The District Court dismissed McPherson’s remaining claims arising under the
Vienna Convention for two independent reasons.  First, the Court concluded that the
Vienna Convention does not create an individual right that is enforceable in United States
Mr. Ulloa is an eligible law student permitted to enter an appearance pursuant to3
Local Civil Rule 46.3.  We commend Mr. Ulloa on his advocacy and appreciate the
participation of amici in this matter.
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courts.  Id. at *8.  Alternatively, the District Court held that McPherson’s claims were
barred by the New Jersey two-year statute of limitations that governs personal injury
actions and is deemed applicable to civil rights actions.  Id. at *9. 
McPherson appealed, and we issued an order inviting the parties to submit briefs
addressing three issues: first, whether a foreign national who is not informed of his right
to consular notification under the Vienna Convention has any individual remedy in
domestic courts; second, whether a claim under the Vienna Convention may be barred by
the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey; and third, whether a
district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) on
statute of limitations grounds.  The United States submitted an amicus brief urging us to
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  We subsequently appointed counsel to file an
amicus brief in support of McPherson.  3
II.
We have jurisdiction over McPherson’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our
review of the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint is plenary.  See Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  We accept McPherson’s factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.  See id.
McPherson argues that the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint as time-
8barred was wrong on both procedural and substantive grounds.  As a procedural matter,
McPherson contends that sua sponte dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is
inconsistent with our holding in Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2002).  On
substantive grounds, McPherson contends, without substantiation, that equitable tolling
may allow him to pursue this action long after the limitations period otherwise expired.
A.
Ray concerned a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) that
states that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  While recognizing that
the statute clearly requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies, we rejected
a pleading rule that would have required a complaint to allege facts demonstrating
exhaustion.  Rather, we held that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense to be
pleaded by the defendant.”  Ray, 285 F.3d at 295.  
We also found that the court below erred in sua sponte dismissing a complaint that
did not demonstrate that the plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies.  Id.  We relied
primarily on the text of §1997e, which provides for sua sponte dismissal if a complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.  Ray, 285 F.3d at 296
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)).  We also noted that the statute explicitly allows a court
9to dismiss a complaint “without first requiring the exhaustion of administrative
remedies.”  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2)).  We concluded, under the principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that the omission of “failure to exhaust” from the
grounds for sua sponte dismissal indicated Congressional intent not to include failure to
exhaust as a reason justifying dismissal.  Id.   
McPherson argues that Ray stands for the general proposition that a court may not
sua sponte dismiss a complaint on the basis of any affirmative defense, including the
statute of limitations.  To be sure, a limitations defense is an affirmative defense.  See
Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002).  Ray, however, does not go as far
as McPherson claims.  This Court has long recognized that the statute of limitations can
serve as the basis for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as long as “the time alleged
in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the
statute of limitations.”  Bethel v. Jendoco Const. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir.
1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This principle is consistent with our
observation in Ray that, “[a]s a general proposition, sua sponte dismissal is inappropriate
unless the basis is apparent from the face of the complaint.”  Ray, 285 F.3d at 297.  Ray’s
failure to exhaust was not apparent from the face of his complaint, so sua sponte
dismissal was not appropriate.  
The fact that a claim has not been brought within the statue of limitations,
however, may be apparent from the face of a complaint.  The United States Supreme
10
Court, while agreeing that failure to exhaust under the PLRA is an affirmative defense
and that plaintiffs need not demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints to survive
dismissal, nonetheless recognized that a court may dismiss a complaint for failing to state
a claim when its allegations show that the complaint is not timely.  The Court noted that
“[i]f the allegations . . . show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations,
the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to make a claim; that does not make the
statute of limitations any less an affirmative defense.”  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215
(2007).  The factual allegations in the complaint, not the label of “affirmative defense,”
control the court’s decision whether to dismiss the suit.  “Whether a particular ground for
opposing a claim may be the basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim depends on
whether the allegations in the complaint suffice to establish that ground, not on the nature
of the ground in the abstract.”  Id.
Failure to exhaust and the statute of limitations are similar “in the abstract”: they
are both affirmative defenses.  But, a court may nonetheless dismiss a suit for failing to
state a claim when the limitations defense is obvious from the face of the complaint.  We
see no reason why a district court, when screening a complaint pursuant to the PLRA,
may not sua sponte dismiss a suit whose allegations make clear that the action is not
timely.  Indeed, other Courts of Appeals have recognized that dismissal under these
circumstances is appropriate.  See, e.g., Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.
2006); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); Nasim v. Warden,
Additionally, district court judges within the Third Circuit have long held that a4
court may sua sponte dismiss complaints on statute of limitations grounds.  See, e.g.,
Cason v. Arie St. Police Dept., Civil No. 10-497 (KSH), 2010 WL 2674399, at *5-6
(D.N.J. June 29, 2010); Derrickson v. Nolan, No. 2:08-cv-668, 2008 WL 2888621, at *4-
5 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2008); Moody v. Sussex Corr. Inst., No. Civ. A. 01-374-SLR, 2002
WL 450083, at *2-3 (D. Del. Mar. 11, 2002); Johnstone v. United States, 980 F. Supp.
148, 154-55 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Pino v. Ryan, 49
F.3d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1995).   We agree that when a statute-of-limitations defense is4
apparent from the face of the complaint, a court may sua sponte dismiss the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
B.
Turning now to the substantive limitations analysis, we have little difficulty
concluding that the untimeliness of McPherson’s action is apparent from the face of the
complaint.  McPherson’s § 1983 claim accrued when he “knew or should have known of
the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Phila., 142
F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).  Thus, the claim accrued at least as early as 1995, when the
arresting agents failed to inform him of his Vienna Convention rights, but certainly no
later than January 12, 1996, the date of McPherson’s conviction.  See Bieregu v.
Ashcroft, 259 F. Supp. 2d 342, 355 (D.N.J. 2003) (noting that the plaintiff’s claim under
the Vienna Convention accrued when the law enforcement officers failed to inform him
of his rights under Article 36, and to the extent that plaintiff relied upon a “continuing
wrong” theory, no later than the date of his conviction).  
12
The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state where
McPherson’s § 1983 claim arose supplies the applicable limitations period.  See Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000). 
The District Court assumed that McPherson’s action arose in New Jersey, not
Pennsylvania.  We need not determine whether the District Court chose correctly, as New
Jersey and Pennsylvania both have a two-year limitations period for personal injury
actions.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.  Because McPherson’s
claim accrued no later than January 12, 1996, the statutes of limitations of New Jersey
and Pennsylvania required McPherson to have filed his suit by January 12, 1998. 
McPherson did not initiate this action until December 26, 2007.
McPherson contends that equitable tolling is warranted because law enforcement
officials “actively misled” him regarding his Vienna Convention rights.  “State law,
unless inconsistent with federal law, also governs the concomitant issue of whether a
limitations period should be tolled.”  Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185
(3d Cir. 2010).  New Jersey or Pennsylvania equitable tolling principles might allow
McPherson’s suit to proceed if he could show that, through no fault of his own, he had
been unable to present this action earlier.  See Binder v. Price Waternouse & Co., 923
A.2d 293, 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (noting that equitable tolling can apply
where “the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into
allowing the filing deadline to pass,” or “where a plaintiff has in some extraordinary way
13
been prevented from asserting his rights”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Uber v.
Slippery Rock Univ. of Pa., 887 A.2d 362, 366 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (noting that
equitable tolling applies “where the defendant actively misleads the plaintiff regarding the
cause of action,” or “where extraordinary circumstances prevent the plaintiff from
asserting his rights”).  
But McPherson cannot make the requisite showing.  Even if we assume that law
enforcement officials misled McPherson at the time of his arrest and conviction, it is
undeniable that McPherson knew about his right to consular notification under the Vienna
Convention since at least 1999.  As evidenced by the June 14, 1999 brief written on his
behalf in his PCRA proceedings, McPherson knew of his rights more than eight years
before he filed this suit.  In light of these facts, McPherson’s invocation of equitable
tolling is unavailing.
It is true, as McPherson argues, that federal tolling principles apply “[w]hen the
state tolling rules contradict federal law or policy.”  Lake, 232 F.3d at 370.  But
McPherson also cannot avail himself of federal equitable tolling rules.  “To be successful
in asserting this exception to the statute of limitations, [the plaintiff] must show that he or
she exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims . . . .  Mere
excusable neglect is not sufficient.”  Robinson, 313 F.3d at 142 (internal quotation marks
omitted).  McPherson has not exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing his claim.  He
waited nearly 12 years after his conviction, and more than eight years after he undeniably
14
knew of his Vienna Convention rights, before commencing this action.  McPherson’s §
1983 claim is time-barred.  
Finally, to the extent McPherson asserts a claim under the Alien Tort Statute, this
claim is also barred by the statute of limitations.  Although the ATS does not include a
statute of limitations, other courts have found that the statute carries a ten-year limitations
period by applying the ten-year statute of limitations governing claims under the Torture
Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note 1.  See, e.g., Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios,
402 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2005); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th
Cir. 2002).  Even if we assume that a ten-year statute of limitations is appropriate with
respect to McPherson’s Vienna Convention claim, and that the defendants “actively
misled” McPherson about his rights in a way that could toll the statute of limitations, the
claim is still untimely.  The ten-year statute would have expired, at the latest, in January
of 2006.  Even assuming McPherson did not know of the alleged violation of the Vienna
Convention until 1999, he still had more than six years on the ten-year limitations period
to bring this suit.  The doctrine of equitable tolling imposes on the plaintiff the obligation
to exercise reasonable diligence in not only investigating, but also bringing the claims. 
Robinson, 313 F.3d at 142; New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116,
1126 (3d Cir. 1997). As the Seventh Circuit has observed: 
When as here the necessary information is gathered after the
claim arose but before the statute of limitations has run, the
presumption should be that the plaintiff could bring the suit
within the statutory period and should have done so. . . .  [A]
15
plaintiff who invokes equitable tolling to suspend the statute
of limitations must bring suit within a reasonable time after he
has obtained, or by due diligence could have obtained, the
necessary information.
Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1990).  McPherson knew of
his rights by 1999.  He waited more than eight years after that to initiate this action.  That
is not a reasonable amount of time.  Consequently, McPherson’s ATS claim is also barred
by the statute of limitations.
III.
Having determined that McPherson’s suit is untimely, we need not decide whether
the Vienna Convention confers any individual rights enforceable in U.S. courts, or
whether a claim under the Vienna Convention may be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.  The
judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
